SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
FORM 6-K
REPORT OF FOREIGN ISSUER
PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-16 OR 15D-16 OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited
ACN 005 357 522
(Translation of registrants name into English)
Level 6, 100 Queen Street Melbourne Victoria 3000 Australia
(Address of principal executive offices)
Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F.
Form 20-F: |
ý |
Form 40-F |
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Indicate by check mark whether the registrant by furnishing the information contained in this Form is also thereby furnishing the information to the Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Yes |
o |
No: |
ý |
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If Yes is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the registrant in connection with Rule 12g3-2(b):
This Form 6-K may contain certain forward-looking statements, including statements regarding (i) economic and financial forecasts, (ii) anticipated implementation of certain control systems and programs, (iii) the expected outcomes of legal proceedings and (iv) strategic priorities. Such forward- looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, many of which are beyond our control and which may cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statement contained in these forward- looking statements. For example, these forward-looking statements may be affected by movements in exchange rates and interest rates, general economic conditions, our ability to acquire or develop necessary technology, our ability to attract and retain qualified personnel, government regulation, the competitive environment and political and regulatory policies.
Company Secretarys Office |
Level 6, 100 Queen Street |
Melbourne VIC 3000 |
Phone 03 9273 6141 |
Fax 03 9273 6142 |
www.anz.com |
ANZ StEPS quarterly distribution
On 15 June 2006 ANZ paid the quarterly distribution on its ANZ Stapled Exchangeable Preferred Securities (ANZ StEPS) and set the Distribution Rate for the payment due on 15 September 2006.
The distribution paid for the quarter ended 15 June 2006 for each ANZ StEPS was based on a Distribution Rate of 6.6050% p.a. as announced on 16 March 2006.
The Distribution Rate for the quarter ending 15 September 2006 has been set in accordance with clause 3.1 of the Note Terms set out in the Prospectus dated 14 August 2003. The Distribution Rate was calculated as follows:
Market Rate (90 day bank bill rate as at 15 June 2006) |
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5.9633 |
% |
p.a |
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Plus the initial margin |
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1.0000 |
% |
p.a |
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Distribution Rate |
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6.9633 |
% |
p.a |
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This distribution of $1.7551 for each ANZ StEPS will be paid on 15 September 2006 with the record date being 31 August 2006.
John Priestley
Company Secretary
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited
for and on behalf of
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited and
ANZ Holdings (New Zealand) Limited
16 June 2006
Searchable text section of graphics shown above
[GRPAHIC]
06
UBS Conference
22 June 2006
Financial management issues to consider when looking at ANZ
Peter Marriott
Chief Financial Officer
www.anz.com |
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[LOGO] |
A quick recap on the first half result
First Half NPAT |
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- |
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$1,811m |
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Cash EPS growth |
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- |
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10% (fully comparable IFRS basis) |
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Dividend growth |
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- |
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10% |
Benefits of our investment program starting to flow through
Cash EPS in line |
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But we continue to invest |
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And we are already |
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Banking expense growth* |
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Banking revenue growth* |
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[CHART] |
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[CHART] |
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[CHART] |
* Excludes wealth management, significant items, and group centre where disclosed
[LOGO]
2
Issues that came out of the result
What should actually constitute Cash EPS?
How does the Collective Provision work, including timing of oil shock collective provision run off?
What will happen with NZ revenue hedge, and likely impact of a softer Kiwi dollar?
How successful was the NZ integration?
Lack of understanding around nature of Markets revenues
Dividend policy and capital management
Asian strategy
3
ANZs definition of Cash EPS
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Reported NPAT |
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Includes deduction for share |
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Distributions for equity instruments post IFRS |
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Hybrid Distributions |
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+/- |
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Hedge Ineffectiveness |
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Averages out to nil overtime, and actual gains/losses are accrued through the P&L anyway (see page 17) |
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+/- |
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Not representative of underlying performance. Typically M&A related |
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Significant items |
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Options not diluted to avoid double |
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Cash Earnings |
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Our hybrid Tier 1 instruments not diluted |
counting as expense included in share |
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÷ |
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as conversion is at ANZs control as there |
based payments |
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is a cash alternative and unlikely to occur |
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Weighted Ave Ord Shares (Basic) |
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except in an extreme scenario |
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(see page 18) |
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Cash Earnings per Share |
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GRCL* movements not applicable as ANZ not required by APRA to create a GRCL
Treasury Shares^ adjustment required only where controlled entity beneficially holds shares in the company, which is not applicable to ANZ
*General Reserve for Credit Losses
^ANZEST, a controlled entity does hold shares but is not beneficially entitled to those shares
4
Collective Provision charge driven by Cards and Esanda
1H06 Collective Provision charge^
Business Unit |
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Asset |
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Risk |
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Oil |
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Total |
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Group |
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55.5 |
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12.0 |
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(32.2 |
) |
35.3 |
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Institutional |
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20.7 |
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(8.5 |
) |
(17.3 |
) |
(5.1 |
) |
Personal (excl Cards & Esanda) |
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6.8 |
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1.3 |
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(3.9 |
) |
4.2 |
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New Zealand |
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12.5 |
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(12.8 |
) |
(6.3 |
) |
(6.6 |
) |
Cards (Aust.) |
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14.7 |
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17.9 |
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(3.0 |
) |
29.6 |
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Esanda |
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2.9 |
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17.7 |
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(3.2 |
) |
17.4 |
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Other* |
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(2.1 |
) |
(3.6 |
) |
1.5 |
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(4.2 |
) |
^based on new organisation structure
*includes International Partnerships, Private Banking and Discontinued Businesses
Cards driven by strong FUM growth and deliberate risk shift to higher revolve rate products
Esanda impacted by oil price affect on residual values, driving higher loss given default levels
Business lending balance determined as follows
CP balance is largely driven by asset growth and movement in risk profile
Individual customers assigned independent risk grades and security coverage indicators
CP methodology based on tenor, risk profile, emergence period and exposure size
5
Oil provision run off to be completed by Sept-09
Illustrative Assumes
status quo conditions
Oil Provision Modelled Run-Off Profile* (A$m)
[CHART]
Divisional Run-Off Profile (% of charge released)
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FY06 |
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FY07 |
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FY08 |
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FY09 |
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Personal |
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42 |
% |
27 |
% |
20 |
% |
11 |
% |
Institutional |
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32 |
% |
34 |
% |
21 |
% |
13 |
% |
New Zealand |
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46 |
% |
29 |
% |
16 |
% |
9 |
% |
See page 21 for an explanation of how the Oil Shock provision was determined
* Subject to changes in conditions
6
NZD revenue hedge a good economic outcome
Why did we hedge?
During 04/05, NZ$ perceived to be significantly overvalued
[CHART]
The right decision! Hedge has created significant value
NZ$ Revenue Hedge very good economic outcome for ANZ
As at mid Jun-06
Notional Principal (NZ$b pre-tax) |
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0.7 |
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Total Market Value (A$m post-tax) |
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199 |
# |
2H06 Benefit |
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41 |
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Post 2006 |
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158 |
* |
Ave. exchange rate of open position (spot) |
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~ 1.095 |
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95% of 2H06 NZ earnings hedged at ~1.106
# based on closing rate of 1.19
* of which $135m has been locked in
7
However under IFRS, a good economic outcome becomes a not so good accounting outcome
From 1 October 2006, revenue hedges are no longer recognised under AIFRS
Therefore on adoption of this new AIFRS requirement on 1 October 2006, deferred gains and Mark to Market value of FX revenue hedges go directly to Retained Earnings
We retain the economic benefit of the hedge, but lose the accounting benefit
Going forward, we will consider hedging where the currency is perceived to be overvalued but as a mix of revenue & capital hedges
All major banks exposed to NZ$ translation impacts
(NZ earnings as % Group^)
[CHART]
FY07 NZ$ EPS impact
[CHART]
*financial year
^1H06 % Group earnings, NAB FY05 % Group earnings
8
NZ integration complete - costs impacted by RBNZ requirements, revenue attrition contained
NZ$m |
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Business |
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Mar-04 |
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Mar-06 |
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Comments |
Integration Costs |
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265 |
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265 |
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239 |
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Reduced scope lowered initial estimates RBNZ requirements increased final costs |
Revenue benefits 2007 pa |
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31 |
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45 |
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50 |
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Driven by Institutional businesses |
Cost Synergies 2007 pa |
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126 |
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126 |
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70 |
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Reduced scope & RBNZ requirements lowered initial estimates NZ$26m incremental benefit in FY07 |
Revenue attrition 2007 pa |
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88 |
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42 |
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34 |
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Retail attrition managed via two brand strategy |
Net benefit |
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69 |
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129 |
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86 |
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See page 20 for phasing of these numbers pre 2007
9
Success of integration and two brand strategy increasingly reflected in share of NZ profits
ANZN generates 40% of the Top 4 banks NPAT
[CHART]
Strategy day for ANZ National will be held in Auckland on 7 September
Source: General Disclosure Statements Top 4 Banks, half yearly results. Data from Dec 04 is restated for IFRS where known. One-off items are excluded where known e.g. integration costs for ANZN. BNZ March 2006 data (and restated March 2005 data) sourced from media release.
10
Putting trading income in perspective accounting disclosures can be misleading
Reported Trading Income being confused with Markets income
[CHART]
Growth misleading given
$16m cost from INGA Capital Invest. hedge in 1H05
1H06 $28m benefit from Swap and FX contracts offset in FX earnings
There is also an interplay between trading income and interest income, as seen on next chart
To understand what is really happening in Markets income, need to look at aggregate picture
[CHART]
Growth a still healthy 21%, driven by:
Higher volatility, particularly in NZ
Increased customer activity (in part driven by increased volatility)
Greater penetration into customer base
11
So how are we generating our Markets income?
Majority of Markets income generated by Sales desk
[CHART]
Reflected in VaR being significantly below peers
(Ave $m VaR @ 99% confidence level)
[CHART]
^WBC & CBA ave. for 1H06, NAB ave. for 2H05
12
Dividend policy & capital management consistent themes
Dividends
Dividends will grow broadly in line with Cash EPS, but seek to look through to normal provisioning
Capping DRP/BOP @ 50,000 shares limits dilution or need to buyback
Payout ratio provides scope for modest acquisitions, and support RWA growth reflective of market share gains
Current payout ratio enables 100% franking for foreseeable future
Capital
APRA recently finalised prudential standards confirming new hybrid rules phasing in over period to Jan 2010; and tougher capital deductions around capitalised software; deferred tax assets and pensions but transitioned to Jan 2008 when Basel II relief expected.
In normal course, we operate in upper half of ACE target range of 4.50% to 5.00%.
Estimated Cash payout ratios based on full year 2005#
[CHART]
# Full year payout ratios used due to seasonality in payout ratios
* Impacted by lower earnings, without commensurate reduction in dividend
13
A CFOs view on Asian partnerships providing ANZ with a valuable growth option
Starting proposition |
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Asia will have higher economic growth than Western economies |
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Financial services will grow more quickly than overall economy |
Key issues I look for:
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Is the market attractive, and is there some relevance to Australia/NZ? |
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Can ANZ add value? |
If not, we should return the capital and let our shareholders invest directly |
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Does it introduce unacceptable risk into our portfolio? |
Diversification is important |
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Do we sufficiently understand the target? |
Have we undertaken extensive due diligence |
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Finally, can we invest at an acceptable price? |
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14
Some closing observations
A pleasing first half, as we started to reap the benefits of our investment program
Credit conditions remain sound, but are at cyclical lows and losses more likely to increase
Overall 2006 expected to be a good year for ANZ
Looking forward, we have a clear growth strategy
Emerging proposition in Personal is compelling
Institutional being rebalanced to a more sustainable model
Our New Zealand business bouncing off low point, helping to offset cyclical NZ slowdown
Asia an attractive and sensible growth option
15
The material in this presentation is general background information about the Banks activities current at the date of the presentation. It is information given in summary form and does not purport to be complete. It is not intended to be relied upon as advice to investors or potential investors and does not take into account the investment objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular investor. These should be considered, with or without professional advice when deciding if an investment is appropriate.
For further information visit
www.anz.com
or contact
Stephen Higgins
Head of Investor Relations
ph: (613) 9273 4185 fax: (613) 9273 4899 e-mail: higgins@anz.com
16
Hedge Ineffectiveness illustration
Sample transaction (Illustrative)
1. ANZ seeks to hedge variable rate exposure in its mortgage portfolio
2. ANZ uses a Pay Floating/Receive Fixed interest rate swap to hedge interest rate exposure
3. Interest rates fall in Year 3
A$m |
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Description |
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Yr 1 |
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Yr 2 |
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Yr 3 |
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Yr 4 |
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Cumulative |
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Mortgage Accrual |
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Variable rate income from underlying Mortgages |
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40 |
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40 |
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30 |
(1) |
30 |
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140 |
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Derivative Accrual |
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Net of Fixed rate received and Variable rate paid on swap |
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10 |
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10 |
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20 |
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20 |
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60 |
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Net Accrual |
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Net interest accrual booked to NII * |
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50 |
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50 |
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50 |
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50 |
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200 |
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Hedge Ineffectiveness |
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Ineffectiveness results from mispricing between cash rate & 3 month variable swap rate |
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1 |
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1 |
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-3 |
(2) |
1 |
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0 |
(3) |
*NII unchanged from AGAAP accounting
(1) Cash rate falls, driving lower variable income, fixed rate unchanged
(2) MTM of hedge falls in line with fall in Variable rates
(3) Ineffectiveness represents portion of deriv. MTM relating to future periods, accordingly cumulative impact is 0 over life of deriv.
17
Diluting for hybrids not reflective of economic reality
US Hybrid as an example
Why are they in the dilution calculation?
On 15 December 2053, there is mandatory conversion to ordinary shares if ANZ hasnt already redeemed them. It is this potential conversion to ordinary shares that results in them being included in the dilution calculation
However conversion to ordinary shares is extremely unlikely
ANZ can redeem the instrument for cash:
On or after 15 December 2013 (US$750m tranche) or 15 January 2010 (US$350m tranche)
Earlier if a tax, regulatory, or acceleration event occurs
With APRAs approval
Even if conversion is instigated by the holder of the instrument, ANZ always maintains the option of delivering cash instead of ordinary shares
Holders are primarily fixed interest investors, who would generally have a strong preference for receiving cash rather than ordinary shares
Conversion is at a 5% discount ie it is very costly to allow them to convert
In what circumstances might they convert to ordinary shares?
Difficult to foresee an environment where raising ordinary capital by allowing conversion to ordinary shares makes more sense than other options available to us
18
Hybrid Deals
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ANZ StEPS |
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US Trust Securities |
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Trust Securities |
Currency & Amount |
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A$1 billion |
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US$1.1
billion |
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EUR500 million |
Issue Date |
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24 September 2003 |
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26 November 2003 |
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13 December 2004 |
Final Maturity Date |
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14
September 2053 |
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15 December 2053 |
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12 December 2053 |
Interest Rate |
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Floating BBSW + 100bpts |
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Fixed US$350m @ 4.48% US$750m @ 5.36% |
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Floating Euribor + 66bpts |
Innovative/Non Innovative |
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Innovative Step up of 100bpts at Sept 2013, or issuer call at Sept 2008 |
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Innovative Convertible to ordinary shares at investors option in Jan 10/Dec 13 |
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Innovative Step up 100bpts at Dec 2014 |
Debt/Equity classification |
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Debt under IFRS |
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Debt under IFRS |
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Equity under A-IFRS as no conversion remains a preference share |
Position to 2010 |
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No change anticipated |
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No change anticipated |
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No change anticipated |
19
NBNZ Integration is complete and all objectives met
NZ$m |
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2004 |
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2005 |
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2006 (f) |
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2007 (f) |
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Total Integration costs |
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49 |
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139 |
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51 |
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0 |
(1) |
Incremental Integration Opex |
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29 |
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85 |
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42 |
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0 |
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Cost synergies |
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6 |
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33 |
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44 |
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70 |
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Revenue synergies |
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1 |
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26 |
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44 |
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50 |
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Attrition |
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20 |
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33 |
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34 |
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34 |
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Net synergies |
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-13 |
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26 |
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54 |
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86 |
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(1) Integration Costs:
10% costs capitalised,
5% covered by restructuring provision, and;
20% from existing resources
The Integration programme was a substantial body of work at a total cost of NZ$239m, which has successfully delivered a major programme for ANZ National Bank:
30 workstreams comprising 150 individual projects have progressed successfully in line with plans;
Around 1300 system changes have been implemented;
At its peak over 600 staff were contributing to the programme;
126 property relocations were implemented.
1H 2006 total integration costs NZ$51m, incremental costs NZ$42m
20
Why an oil shock provision?
The significant increase in oil prices was an impairment event likely to impact credit losses
WTI Crude Oil Price
[CHART]
Source: Datastream; Economics@ANZ.
As a result of this event, we undertook detailed analysis across our portfolios to determine potential impacts.
Two examples:
Example - Institutional
Analysis around regressing Oil Price movements against probability of default (PD) movements based upon S&P data from 1981 to 2003 suggested a 35% increase in average PD broadly across the Institutional segment
Affected industries represent approximately 50% of the portfolio these would experience twice the PD increase (ie 70%)
Example Personal unsecured
Analysis from ANZ Economics suggested that the increase in Oil Price could have the equivalent affect of a 0.50% increase in interest rates
This effect was translated into an effect on the household Debt Service Ratio (historically there has been a high correlation between movements in the DSR and consumer finance losses).
A 0.5% increase in rates resulted in a ~7% increase in DSR and therefore resulting in expected higher losses
21
There can be no assurance that actual outcomes will not differ materially from the forward-looking statements contained in the Form 6-K.
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
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Australia and New Zealand |
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(Registrant) |
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By: |
/s/ John Priestley |
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Company Secretary |
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Date 07 July 2006